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27 March 1964

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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DAILY BRIEF

South Korea: [The Pak government is increasingly hard pressed to control the student mobs protesting its negotiations with Japan]

[Some 25-30,000 students demonstrated in the capital yesterday for the third successive day, while smaller numbers demonstrated in other major cities. In Seoul, the students were joined by about 300 opposition party members. There have been unconfirmed rumors that some university professors intend to stage a march to support the students.]

[At the request of the South Koreans, the US commander of UN forces in Korea has released the equivalent of two battalions of Korean troops to augment the security forces in Seoul.]

[Despite the demonstrations, Pak has announced that he intends to proceed with the Tokyo negotiations. Pressure for him to delay a settlement is, however, building up among his followers in the cabinet and legislature and he has recalled his key negotiator, Kim Chong-pil, from Tokyo. Negotiations on the critical fishery issue presumably are continuing on both the ambassadorial level and between the respective agricultural ministers.]

[Some anti-Kim Chong-pil members of the government are urging Pak to make Kim the public scapegoat for the negotiations, and to refer the question of relations with Japan to a national referendum.]

(Continued)

The demonstrations have had few anti-American overtones. If pressures develop further, however, Pak may attempt to deflect agitation toward the US. 1

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Cyprus: [The situation remains outwardly calm, but the Greek Cypriots are continuing to strengthen their military positions.]

[The British state that the Greek Cypriots now have some 45 improvised armored vehicles. They also reportedly have dug new positions on the north side of the mountains above Kyrenia in an area where armed Turkish Cypriots are concentrated.]

[The Turkish Cypriots, demoralized by the mauling they have received from the Greek Cypriots, have approached the Turkish Government for aid in determining their course of action. The Turkish Cypriot minister of agriculture is in Ankara seeking either assurances of strong support during the period of UN mediation or Ankara's assistance in a mass migration to Turkey.]

[Greek-Turkish relations meanwhile have taken another turn for the worse. Athens has strongly protested Turkey's expulsion of several Greek citizens for alleged "illegal activities" and for violating a 1932 law which restricts the practice of certain professions to Turkish citizens. The Greek consul general in Istanbul claims the local Greek community is terrified. He has been told by the police that there will be additional deportations.]

[These actions are probably intended in part to offset, in the eyes of the Turkish public, the government's failure to intervene in Cyprus.]

[Some Turkish Air Force units have returned to their home bases, but others continue to participate in combined military exercises in the Iskenderun area. A large-scale amphibious exercise, with commercial vessels integrated for the first time, was apparently held on 24-25 March and additional exercises are reported to be scheduled for April.]

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South Vietnam: General Khanh seems to be winning wider military and political support.

Khanh's vigor in pushing military operations against the Viet Cong is generating greater respect for him among officers of the Joint General Staff and the Armor Command.

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[redacted] the chiefs of the airborne and marine brigades, as well as the Armor Command, are now backing the regime.

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According to the US consul in Hué, Khanh has been delegating administrative authority in the northern provinces to local political party leaders. These leaders appear to be developing a strongly anti-Communist and popularly based administrative structure. Some of their parties, however, are faction ridden, and Khanh's tactic may encourage local political feuds.

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
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France: France appears to be considering construction of a space or missile test facility in French Guiana.

In his major speech in Cayenne on 21 March, De Gaulle said that France is determined to overcome the obstacles of nature in Guiana, and that important developments have already begun there.

A source of the US consul in Martinique reports that the "fact" that a missile range is being planned is fairly widely known in Cayenne. The source believes that technical uncertainties have delayed a final decision to proceed. The consul had earlier reported that Kaiser Aluminum was turned down in its request to build a bauxite loading port in Guiana because the site would be too close to a proposed missile launching station.

These and other reports refer to the construction of a military missile test site, but a space-associated facility would be more likely. France must give up its missile/space facility at Colombo Bechar in the Sahara in 1967, and it is building a new military missile test site south of Bordeaux.

Placing a test site in Guiana would allow firing in a west-to-east direction, which is important for a space launch. Climatic and construction difficulties there, however, would be considerable. Some less ambitious project in Guiana--such as a space tracking station or staging base for flights from France to the Pacific nuclear test center--is also possible.

A major project would have several political advantages from De Gaulle's point of view. In addition to supplying a reason for developing the economy of the area, it would encourage immigration from the French West Indies. Announcement of such a project would assist De Gaulle's effort to build French prestige in Latin America.

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Turkey: Turkey may be headed for another cabinet crisis unless the Grand National Assembly acts favorably on Prime Minister Inonu's tax reform program by the end of the month.

Inonu has threatened to resign unless the tax bills, on which his government's economic program is based, are passed. The opposition, whose parliamentary strength is close to that of the government, appears determined to defeat the tax measures.

Leaders of the Justice Party, the major opposition grouping, previously had decided to await new elections before trying to overturn Inonu. Recently, however, the party leadership formally stated its willingness to try to form a government if asked. The JP leaders evidently believe that the military's earlier strong opposition to the party's assuming power has been worn down.

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Chile: [The outcome of the Chilean presidential election in September may hinge on the 400,000 votes of the Radical Party (PR)]

[Communist-Socialist (FRAP) candidate Salvador Allende believes that the Radicals have the "swing vote," and admits that if they back Christian Democrat (PDC) Eduardo Frei at their 4 April plenum, PDC victory is assured. FRAP cannot win without them.]

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[His appeal for PR endorsement, Allende added, created problems within FRAP. Although his own Socialists are annoyed by the overture, the disciplined Communists have kept silent. Allende asserted, in an apparent reference to campaign strategy, that he intends to make his own policy.]

[Frei continues to feel that the Conservative and Liberal parties are disposed to back him at their mid-April plenums. Foreign Minister Philippi has commented, however, that while the rightists will join Frei, he will have a difficult time winning without Radical backing.]

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Communist China - Japan: Peiping and Tokyo will probably soon take another step toward closer relations.

An unofficial agreement to exchange newsmen between the two countries may be signed soon. A high-level NCNA representative is now in Japan with full powers to conclude a final agreement with the Japan Newspaper Publishers and Editors Association. Shortly after Peiping proposed an unofficial agreement, the Japanese foreign minister expressed approval in a speech in the Diet on 18 February. Peiping is moving quickly to take advantage of the opening.

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NOTES

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India-Pakistan: President Ayub's acceptance of Nehru's latest bid for ministerial talks should help, if only indirectly, to calm Hindu-Muslim communal tensions. Ayub can be expected to try, in line with his previous proposals, to include Kashmir in the agenda. The Indians presumably will try to keep the talks limited to the immediate causes of communal tensions, such as the playing up of incidents in the press and the continuing evictions and mistreatment of minorities in each country.

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